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Abstract: With the increasing popularity of online retailing, this research investigates the 
alternative online operation strategies regarding commission price when selling through 
online platforms. We exploit a triadic network setting that consists of one online platform firm 
and two competing vendors and examine the strategic choice of the involved parties to 
effectively compete in the marketplace. We develop game models for alternative commission 
pricing strategies and obtain the equilibrium solutions. Through a comparison of equilibrium 
solutions, our analysis reveals that alternative commission pricing strategies lead to different 
economic results for the online platform and the two vendors individually and collectively. 
While vendors can take necessary actions (e.g., an additional fee for an exclusive pricing right) 
to maximize their own benefit, competing vendors can also respond to their rival’s strategic 
choice to minimize the negative impact of the deal reached by the other two parties. Our 
findings also suggest that the exclusive pricing right that the lead vendor tried to secure 
results in a higher commission fee paid to the online platform. Through modelling strategic 
behavior and consequential economic results in the setting of a triad network, our research 
also responds to the proposition that structural and behavioral approaches represent 
incommensurable ideas, and we show that a combined theoretical strategy appears 
well-adapted to the complex realities of interfirm networks. 
Key words: Commission fee; pricing strategy; online retailing; game theory. 




1 Introduction  
The retail sector has been experiencing a significant consumer behavioral shift with the wide 
adoption of Internet technology and mobile devices in the last two decades. According to 
Statista (2018), retail e-commerce sales worldwide reached 2.3 trillion US dollars in 2017 and 
e-retail revenues are projected to increase to 4.88 trillion US dollars by 2021. As more 
consumers shop online, there have been several high-profile bankruptcies and store closures 
in recent years, including some biggest household names, such as Macy’s and Sears in the 
United States (U.S.), and House of Fraser in the United Kingdom (UK). At the same time, 
when conventional offline retailers try to build their presence online, there are some greatly 
successful online platforms (e.g., Amazon.com, Taobao, and JD.com). Among them, Amazon, 
the online technology giant, reported record retail sales in 2017 amounting to full-year 
revenue of $177.9 billion driven by a surge in online shopping over the holiday season, which 
is an increase of nearly a third compared to 2016 (BBC, 2018). In China, led by marketplace 
firms such as Taobao and JD.com, online retail sales passed $1 trillion for the first time in 
2017, an increase of 32% over the previous year (Lin, 2017; Lin and Abkowitz, 2017).  
As a result, many vendors or bands move to online platforms such as Amazon.com or 
JD.com to become direct-to-consumer vendors (Gao et al., 2017; Luo et al, 2018). For 
instance, Amazon has over two million third-party vendors operating on its platform, and all 
vendors on Amazon.com have to pay a commission type “Referral Fee” for every item that 
sells through the platform. For Amazon, the income (e.g., commission fee) from 3rd party 
vendors is the second main revenue source after retail products it sells on its own. Therefore, 
from online platform firms’ perspective, it is important to charge a good commission price to 
guarantee a crucial revenue source. From vendors’ (e.g., vendors/brands) perspective, it is 
equally important since a high rate will increase operating costs and affect their profit margin. 
Practically, there are three possible commission pricing strategies for the online platform to 
adopt: (i) according to each vendor who sells common goods simultaneously to determine 
different commission prices; (ii) according to the lead vendor to decide the commission price 
and apply the same determined rate to other vendors; (iii) according to the follower vendors to 
decide the commission price and apply the same determined rate to other vendors, including 
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the lead vendor. We take JD.com, one of the largest online e-commerce platform companies in 
China, as an example. According to the Open Platform Investment and Tariff Standard of 
JD.com, JD.com has two ways to determinate the commission fee. The first one is for a 
product category, JD.com sets a fixed commission price to all the vendors who want to sell 
product through the online platform. The second one is that JD.com sets different commission 
prices to different vendors based on each vendor’s condition respectively. However, as far as 
we know, there are few studies that systematically examine the alternative commission pricing 
strategies. Only a similar problem with different pricing policies is examined by Chen et al. 
(2012). But their examination of different pricing strategies is in a setting of a two-echelon 
supply chain, which is different to the setting of online retail platform considered in this study. 
The above observations motivate us to investigate the following research questions: 
• What is the best strategy for the online platform to determine commission price to vendors? 
Reciprocally, what are the best commission pricing strategies for vendors? 
• How can the vendors respond to the online platform and their competitors’ optimal 
commission pricing strategies to protect their own interests? 
• How do these different commission pricing strategies affect the supply chain and 
consumers? 
There is a growing stream of literature that discusses the importance of the strategy 
choices between online platform firms and vendors that focuses on the trade-offs between 
alternative options. Previous research addressing this general question has focused on channel 
competition and coordination (Cai, 2010; Ryan et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2017), online and 
offline channel integration (Gallino and Moreno, 2014; Cao and Li, 2015), channel structure 
and choice (Yoo and Lee, 2011; Chen, and Wang, 2015; Luo et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018) 
and information asymmetry (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2011; Chen et al., 
2019b). Our focus is different, as the goal of this paper is to examine the differences of firms’ 
choices among alternative commission pricing strategies when engaging online platform 
retailing operations. We exploit a triadic network setting that consists of one online platform 
firm and two competing vendors who sell through the online platform. We examine the 
strategic choice of effectively competing in the marketplace and find that vendors’ optimal 
strategies evolve over time depending on a choice of rival vendors. 
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We summarize the key findings of our study as follows. First, our analysis reveals that 
alternative commission pricing strategies lead to different economic results for the online 
platform and the two vendors individually and collectively. While vendors can take necessary 
actions (e.g., an additional fee for an exclusive commission pricing right) to maximize their 
own benefit, competing firms can also respond to their rivals’ strategic choices to minimize 
the negative impact of the deal reached between their rivals and the platform firm. The 
strategic behavior and consequential economic results captured in this study provide 
important managerial implications for firms operating in the online marketplace. Our findings 
also suggest that the exclusive commission pricing right that most industrial leaders try to 
secure does not necessarily result in a lower commission price paid to the online platform. 
Instead, it leads to a higher commission price, which enables them to gain benefits in the 
horizontal competition with rival firms. Although such an exclusive commission pricing 
strategy can deliver better economic performance for both the powerful vendor and the online 
platform, we will show in this paper that the better economic performance is not sustainable 
as the improved economic performance is at the expense of smaller vendors and consumers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review the relevant 
literature and examine how our study relates to the existing literature. This is followed by a 
description of the model and equilibrium analysis in Section 3. Then, we examine the impact 
of alternative commission pricing strategies on the economic performance of the online 
platform and the two vendors and analyze vendors’ battle for the exclusive commission 
pricing right in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We highlight the change in the commission fee 
under different commission pricing strategies in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper 
with a summary of key insights and possible avenues for future extension. 
 
2 Literature review 
This study is closely related to the following two streams of literature: (i) online retailing 
e-commerce models, and (ii) online strategy regarding pricing and commission fees. Now, we 
discuss how our research relates to the literature in the above areas. 
Online retailing through the e-marketplace has attracted extensive attention in recent 
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years. One stream of relevant literature investigates the optimal choices among the different 
e-commerce models available to firms when engaging in online retailing. For instance, from 
the perspective of both marketplace firms and vendors, Ryan et al. (2012) analyzed the 
optimal decisions for both partners and characterized the equilibrium of the online 
marketplace system. Hagiu and Wright (2014) examined the fundamental trade-offs faced by 
an intermediary when choosing whether to operate as a marketplace or a reseller and found 
that the choice between the two modes is determined by the relevant important information 
that the intermediary or the independent suppliers have regarding the optimal tailoring of 
marketing activities for each specific product. Abhishek et al. (2015) investigated the channel 
structure choice between agency selling and reselling for online retailing. Here, the main 
difference between the two selling formats is that the retail prices are decided by the e-tailer 
in reselling, whereas in agency selling they are decided by the vendor and the e-tailer charges 
a commission fee for sales made through the channel, which is similar to the marketplace (e.g., 
Amazon). The findings of Abhishek et al. (2015) show that the preference between two 
channels depends on the negative or positive impact of the sales in the e-channel on the 
demand in the traditional channel, and this preference is mediated by competition between 
e-tailers. More recently, Tian et al. (2018) explored the strategic contractual choice between 
marketplace, reseller or hybrid (both marketplace and reseller operations) for online retailers. 
Their findings suggested that the selection of an optimal mode for the intermediary is 
moderated by the interaction of order fulfillment costs and upstream competition intensity. 
With the increasing growth of online platforms, there is a growing body of literature on 
contractual design regarding pricing and commission fees in recent years. Inspired by 
Amazon's e-marketplace business model, Wang et al. (2004) studied consignment contracts 
with revenue sharing mechanisms by which marketplace firms (e.g., Amazon) collect 
commission fees when vendors’ items are sold through the online platform. Mantin et al. 
(2014) investigated the strategic role of 3rd party marketplaces in online retailing. They found 
that the presence of 3rd party marketplaces can weaken the upstream monopolist’s ability to 
extract profits from a downstream retailer. Furthermore, although consumers also benefit from 
this presence, this benefit diminishes as the retailer’s power increases. Hao et al. (2017) 
investigated a mobile platform's in-app advertising contract under agency pricing for app sales, 
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and their research findings indicated that the advertising revenue-sharing contract results in a 
higher app price. Tan and Carrillo (2017) analyzed the agency model, in which the publisher 
determines the retail price and the online platform collects a predetermined commission fee in 
the context of the digital goods industry. Their analysis found that the agency model, with 
price setting by the suppliers, performs better than the wholesale model because of a 
decreased level of double marginalization and an increased level of consumer surplus. More 
recently, Geng et al. (2018) investigated the interaction between a vendor’s add-on strategy 
and an online platform’s distraction contract choice. Their analysis results found that a higher 
commission rate does not always lead to greater profit for the platform under the agency 
contract. Our paper is different from the above studies in that we focus more on the 
interaction of different strategies in the contractual commission prices between the online 
platform and two vendors.  
Our research is different from the abovementioned studies in that the question we 
address in this paper focuses on the impact of commission price strategies on the platform, 
vendors, and consumers, which has not been studied in the literature. Furthermore, we model 
the vendors’ behavioral change in seeking for their own profit maximization, or alternatively 
minimizing the negative impact of the deal reached by the other two parties in a triadic 
network setting. 
 
3 Model and equilibrium 
This paper studies the management problem of commission pricing strategies in online 
platform selling. We consider a stylized supply chain that comprises two vendors and an 
online platform firm (To simplify, we use “V1” and “V2” to denote vendor 1 and vendor 2). 
Figure 1 provides the format of online platform selling in this paper. The online platform 
offers an e-marketplace through which vendors can sell products, and for each product that 
the vendors sell, the online platform will charge a predetermined commission fee, which is 
transferred between the vendors and the online platform. Unlike the traditional supply chain, 
in this online platform retailing format, the online platform is not a reseller; instead, it is 
similar to an agent and charges a certain agency fee (Wang et al., 2004; Hagiu and Wright, 
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2015). The product sale quantity and retail price are decided by the upstream vendors, not the 
downstream online platform.  
 
Figure 1. Online platform selling format 
In this model, we assume that V1 and V2 sell perfectly substitutable products but hold 
different upper bounds of market prices, 𝛼𝑖, and unit selling costs, 𝑐𝑖 (caused by different 
operating efficiency), which leads to different maximum marginal profits, 𝛿𝑖, since 𝛿𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖. Without a loss of generality, V1 has a competitive advantage over V2 when assuming 
that the maximum marginal profit of V1 is higher than that of V2, namely 𝛿1 > 𝛿2. Please 
note that the upstream vendors can also be retailers who purchase products from a common 
manufacturer at the same wholesale price but with different unit operating costs. The online 
platform is a Stackelberg leader and has three alternative strategies of determining 
commission prices for V1 and V2. To make it clear, we use Strategies A, B, and C for the 
three alternative strategies:  
Strategy A: The online platform decides the commission price of V1 only (the one with 
more competitive advantage), and charges V2 the same commission price as V1.  
Strategy B: The online platform decides the commission price of V2 only (the one with 
less competitive advantage), and charges V1 the same commission price as V2.  
Strategy C: The online platform makes commission price decision for both V1 and V2, 
and two different commission prices are decided discriminatingly for each vendor.  
We denote the parameters and variables for model development by the notations shown 
in Table 1. 














𝛼𝑖 Upper bound of market price for vendor 𝑖 
𝑐𝑖 Unit selling cost of vendor 𝑖 
𝑠𝑖
𝑘 Commission price to vendor 𝑖 under strategy 𝑘 
𝑞𝑖
𝑘 Sale quantity of vendor 𝑖 under strategy 𝑘 
𝑝𝑖
𝑘 Retail price of vendor 𝑖 under strategy 𝑘 
𝛽 Sensitivity of sale quantity to price 
𝜋𝑖
𝑘(∙) Vendor 𝑖’s profit under strategy 𝑘 
𝜋𝑂
𝑘(∙) Online platform’s profit under strategy 𝑘 
𝜋𝑆𝐶
𝑘 (∙) Entire supply chain’s profit under strategy 𝑘 
𝛿𝑖 Maximum marginal profit of vendor 𝑖, 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 
𝜌 
Ratio of maximum marginal profit, 𝜌 = 𝛿1 𝛿2⁄ > 1 since 𝛿1 > 𝛿2; to depict the gap of 
competitive advantage between V1 and V2 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, and 𝑘 = 𝐴 means Strategy A, 𝑘 = 𝐵 means Strategy B, and 𝑘 = 𝐶 means Strategy C. 
The market demand is assumed to be deterministic and dependent on price. Since V1 and 
V2 sell perfectly substitutable products, then the sensitivity of sale quantity to price is the 
same. Therefore, to clearly show the substitutional relationship of products, we use an inverse 
demand function, which is expressed as  
𝑝𝑖
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑞𝑗
𝑘)        (1) 
Where  𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑗 = 3 − 𝑖. Such demand functions have been commonly used in the 
economics and marketing literatures to capture competition between multiproduct retailers 
(Trivedi, 1998; Feng and Lu, 2012; Huang et al., 2013; Chen et al. 2019a).  
For each sold product, the vendors should pay the online platform a commission fee, 
hence the vendors’ profit function is  
𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = (𝑝𝑖
𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖
𝑘)𝑞𝑖
𝑘       (2) 
and the online platform’s profit function is  
𝜋𝑂(𝑠𝑖
𝑘, 𝑠𝑗
𝑘) = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑘𝑞𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1         (3) 
Moreover, the model and optimization are studied under the assumption of information 
symmetry. The online platform and both vendors know all the information about each other. 
And the vendors and the online platform are risk-neutral and each of them only cares about 
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their own profit maximization. The next several subsections detail the game among the online 
platform, V1, and V2 under the different commission pricing strategies, and provide the 
optimal solutions to the commission price and sale quantity, as well as the retail prices and 
profits.  
3.1 Strategy A: The online platform sets commission price for V1 only 
When the online platform sets commission price to V1 only, V2 will not affect the 
determination of the commission price and just accepts the commission price decided by the 
online platform. Thus, the decision sequence of the vendors and the online platform is as 
follows. In the first-stage game, the online platform announces the commission price 
anticipating the optimal reaction of V1. In the second-stage game, given the commission price, 
V1 and V2 decide their optimal sale quantities simultaneously. In the third-stage game, the 
optimal commission price and the maximum profits of the online platform, V1, and V2 are 
obtained. 
3.2 Strategy B: The online platform sets commission price for V2 only 
Similar to Strategy A, when the online platform sets commission price for V2 only, V1 will 
not participate nor influence the determination of the commission price and will just accept 
the commission price decided by the online platform. Thus, the decision sequence of the 
vendors and the online platform is as follows. In the first-stage game, the online platform 
announces the commission price anticipating the optimal reaction of V2. In the second-stage 
game, given the commission price, V1 and V2 decide their optimal sale quantities 
simultaneously. In the third-stage game, the optimal commission price and the maximum 
profits of the online platform, V1, and V2 are obtained. 
3.3 Strategy C: The online platform sets commission price for both V1 and V2 
When the online platform sets commission price to both V1 and V2, different commission 
prices are set discriminatingly for V1 and V2 simultaneously. Thus, the decision sequence of 
the vendors and online platform is as follows. In the first-stage game, the online platform 
announces two different commission prices considering the reactions of V1 and V2. In the 
second-stage game, given the commission prices, V1 and V2 decide their optimal sale 
quantities simultaneously. In the third-stage game, the optimal commission prices and the 
maximum profits of the online platform, V1, and V2 are obtained. 
 
10 
3.4 Equilibrium solutions 
Based on the game models for the three different commission pricing strategies, we can get 
the optimal solutions to the commission prices of the online platform and the sale quantities 
of both V1 and V2. The derivation of the equilibrium solutions is shown in the Appendix. 
Lemma 1. For each commission pricing strategy, there exist unique optimal commission 
prices and sale quantities, as summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Equilibrium solutions 













































Based on the equilibrium solutions of V1, V2, and online platform, we can get the retail 
prices and profits, which are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Retail prices and profits 



















































































Because of the nonnegativity of the sale quantity, retail price, and commission price 
under the three commission pricing strategies, the ratio of the maximum marginal of profit 
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should satisfy 1 < 𝜌 <
4
3
. The following discussion is on the interval.  
 
4 Analysis of commission pricing strategies on firms’ performance 
In this section, we analyze the optimal commission pricing strategy from the online platform’s 
perspective. Since the online platform is a Stackelberg leader, it has the priority to choose a 
commission pricing strategy that brings it the most benefit. Through inputting the equilibrium 





This proposition indicates that, when the online platform sets commission price to both 
V1 and V2, the maximum profit it can gain is more than that of the other two commission 
pricing strategies. That is, to get the most economic benefit, the online platform should set 
commission price to every single vendor according to each vendor’s specific circumstance 
(e.g., cost information and profit margin). The online platform can maximize economic 
benefit with this discriminatory pricing method.  
Next, we discuss the effect of different commission pricing strategies on the vendors’ 
profits. The following corollary can be derived. 
Corollary 1.  
1) For V1, when 𝟏 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟏, then 𝝅𝟏
𝑨 > 𝝅𝟏
𝑪 ≥ 𝝅𝟏















It is clear that V1 produces the best economic performance when the online platform sets 
commission price to V1 only. However, the choice between the other two commission pricing 
strategies (set commission price to V2 only or to both V1 and V2) is dependent on how much 
competitive advantage V1 has over V2 (parameter 𝜌). When the competitive advantage is 
lower than 𝐼𝑃1, the strategy of setting commission prices for both V1 and V2 is better than 
that of setting commission price for V2 only, and vice versa. However, V2 can gain the most 
profit when the online platform sets commission price to both V1 and V2. Interestingly, for 
V2, this commission pricing strategy leads to better performance than when the online 
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platform sets commission price to V2 only. In addition, V2 produces the worst economic 
performance when the online platform sets commission price to V1 only. Therefore, V2 is 
unwilling to see that and will take necessary actions to prevent such a commission pricing 
strategy.  
 
5 Vendors’ battle for the right commission pricing strategy 
The last section examines the online platform’s optimal choice of commission pricing strategy 
and the economic impact of different commission pricing strategies on the two vendors. 
Based on the findings of Corollary 1, we can argue that, from the perspective of V1, it is 
preferable for the online platform to set commission price to V1 only, since this strategy 
allows V1 to get more profit. Therefore, V1 always has the desire to fight for an exclusive 
commission pricing right. However, from the perspective of V2, it is better for the online 
platform to set commission price to both vendors rather than with V1 only. Therefore, from 
the vendors’ perspective, V1 and V2 will take extra measures to fight for the commission 
pricing right that maximizes their own benefits. Now we discuss the options of the battle for 
commission pricing rights between V1 and V2 and their effects on system equilibrium.  
5.1 V1’s behavior 
Based on Corollary 1, the optimal solution for V1 is to secure an exclusive commission 
pricing right. However, securing an exclusive commission pricing right has to meet two 




𝐶 , is to ensure that under an exclusive 
commission pricing right by the online platform, V1 has enough profit to make up the online 
platform’s profit loss, so that the online platform will have a profit that is not less than the 
case where the online platform sets commission price to both vendors. It means an exclusive 
commission pricing right by the online platform requires V1 to have an ability to make a 





is to ensure that V2 cannot stop V1 from getting the exclusive commission pricing right. Only 
when both conditions are satisfied, can V1 win the commission pricing right battle. We derive 
the following proposition to show V1’s behavior. 
Proposition 2.  
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1) When 𝟏 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟑, V1 cannot capture the exclusive commission pricing right, since 
a) If 𝟏 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟐, V1’s profit is not enough to make a “bigger pie”; 
b) If 𝑰𝑷𝟐 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟑, the pie is not big enough to break through V2’s obstruction. 
2) When 𝑰𝑷𝟑 < 𝝆 <
𝟒
𝟑








Proposition 2 highlights that whether V1 can secure an exclusive commission pricing 
right is highly dependent on the gap of competitive advantage between V1 and V2. As 
illustrated in Corollary 1, only V1 has an incentive to compete for an exclusive commission 
pricing right. However, having an incentive to do so does not guarantee the success of 
securing the right. The first part of Proposition 2 shows that V1 has no guarantee of capturing 
the exclusive commission pricing right for two reasons. First, V1 cannot make a “bigger pie” 
for the online platform nor achieve a Pareto improvement when the margin of the competitive 
advantage between V1 and V2 is lower than a critical threshold (𝜌 ≤ 𝐼𝑃2). Second, as the 
margin of the competitive advantage between the two vendors increases to the extent that it is 
higher than the critical threshold (𝜌 > 𝐼𝑃2), this “bigger pie” can be made. However, because 
of the obstruction from V2, who would prefer the online platform to employ a bilateral 
commission pricing strategy instead of a unilateral commission pricing strategy, the increased 
“pie” is still not sufficient for V1 to overthrow V2’s countermeasure. Therefore, only when 
the margin of the competitive advantage between the two vendors further increases to a 
certain extent (𝐼𝑃3 < 𝜌 <
4
3
), can V2 not stop V1, and eventually V1 can capture the 
exclusive commission pricing right. Hence, we can conclude that, fundamentally, to secure 
the exclusive commission pricing right, V1 has to take necessary strategic and tactical actions, 
such as improving cost efficiency and adding product value, to increase its competitive 
advantage over the rival vendor. 
5.2 V2’s behavior 
This section examines V2’s behavior in the battle for its desirable commission pricing 
strategy. 
Proposition 3. At any time, V2 has no desire to capture the exclusive commission pricing 
right but stop V1 from doing so, and V2 can only afford to stop V1 when 𝟏 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟑. 
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For V2, there is no incentive to fight for the exclusive commission pricing right since its 
economic performance will be worse than that when the online platform sets commission 
price to both V1 and V2. However, V2 will stop V1 from getting the exclusive commission 
pricing right to prevent the worst case scenario when the gap of competitive advantage 
between V1 and V2 is relatively small. Otherwise, V1 is able to break through V2’s 
obstruction.  
According to Propositions 2 and 3, Strategy A and Strategy C are the focus of the battle 
between V1 and V2. The profits of V1, V2, and the online platform under Strategy A and 
Strategy C determine the victor or loser in the battle, and consequently the final commission 
price strategy. To depict the effect of V1’s and V2’s behavior in the battle for their preferable 
commission price strategies based on the gap of competitive advantage, we firstly provide an 
original Figure 2 without battle to show the profits of both vendors and the online platform 
under Strategy A and Strategy C. Then the effect of vendors’ behavior on profit is shown in 
Figure 3. The detail of the numerical example illustration can be found in Appendix.  
Figure 2 provides us a profit graph of both vendors and online platform without the 
battle battling behavior under Strategy A and Strategy C. This figure also confirms the 
conclusions obtained by Corollary 1. Figure 2 clearly shows that V1 prefers the online 
platform to adopt Strategy A, while the online platform and V2 want to adopt Strategy C. 
Proven by Propositions 2 and 3, the battle behavior between V1 and V2 may change the 
commission pricing strategy adopted by the online platform. Here we use Figure 3 to provide 




Figure 2. Profits without vendors’ battle behavior 
 
Figure 3. Effect of vendors’ battle behavior on profits 
From Figure 3, we can see that, overall, the maximum profit of V2 decreases, whereas 

















































V2 extends. The feasible interval is divided into two subregions. In region I, the exclusive 
commission pricing right with the online platform cannot be reached by V1. In region I(1), 
even though V1 has a desire for the exclusive commission pricing right, the resulting “pie” is 
not big enough for the online platform and V1 to achieve Pareto improvement. Hence, 
bilateral commission pricing right between the online platform and vendors is maintained. In 
region I(2), although the resulting “pie” from V1’s exclusive commission pricing right is big 
enough for V1 and the online platform to achieve Pareto improvement, V2 can stop such an 
exclusive right by sharing a fraction of its profit ∆𝜋2−𝑂
𝐶  with the online platform. As a result, 
the maximum profit of V2 under bilateral commission pricing right (𝜋2
𝐶 , dotted blue line) 
moves down ∆𝜋2−𝑂
𝐶  units and the maximum profit of the online platform under bilateral 
commission pricing right (𝜋𝑂
𝐶 , dotted black line) moves up ∆𝜋2−𝑂
𝐶  units. In interval II, V1 
has enough capability to break through V2’s obstacle because of its competitive advantage 
over V2, and therefore it is able to get the exclusive commission pricing right by sharing a 
fraction of its profit of ∆𝜋1−𝑂
𝐴  units with the online platform. As a result, V1’s profit under 
the exclusive commission pricing strategy moves down ∆𝜋1−𝑂
𝐴  units (𝜋1
𝐴, full red line) but is 
still greater than its profit under the bilateral commission pricing strategy (𝜋1
𝐶 , dotted red line), 
and the online platform’s profit increases to a higher level under exclusive commission 
pricing to V1 (𝜋𝑂
𝐴, full black line) than under bilateral commission pricing strategy (𝜋𝑂
𝐶 , 
dotted black line). 
5.3 Impact analysis 
In this section, we examine the impact of vendors’ battle over commission pricing strategies 
on the entire supply chain and consumers from the perspectives of economic performance and 
retail prices.  
Proposition 4.  
1) For the entire supply chain, when 𝟏 < 𝝆 ≤ 𝑰𝑷𝟒 , then 𝝅𝑺𝑪
𝑪 ≥ 𝝅𝑺𝑪
𝑨 > 𝝅𝑺𝑪
𝑩 ; when 















From Proposition 4, we can see that, for the entire supply chain, the total profit in the 
case where the online platform sets commission price to V2 exclusively is the worst. Hence, 
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in that respect, an exclusive commission pricing strategy between the online platform and the 
weaker vendor should be avoided. This finding is also in line with current industry practices, 
in which, the online platform firms often adopt the bilateral commission pricing strategy or 
exclusive commission pricing strategy to the industry leader only if an exclusive commission 
pricing strategy is implemented. Recalling the key threshold 𝐼𝑃3  of the exclusive 
commission pricing right battle in Propositions 2, 3 and Figure 3, we can know that 𝐼𝑃3 <
𝐼𝑃4 . Therefore, even when 𝐼𝑃3 < 𝜌 < 𝐼𝑃4 , the entire supply chain delivers the best 
economic performance under the bilateral commission pricing strategy. V1 still has the 
economic capability to exercise its power to get the exclusive commission pricing right, and 
V2 does not have the economic capability to tip the balance. For customers, the exclusive 
commission pricing strategy with the powerful vendor raises both vendors’ retail prices 
compared to the bilateral commission pricing strategy, which hurts consumers.  
 
6 Commission price 
According to the analysis in Section 5, we know that when 𝐼𝑃3 < 𝜌 <
4
3
, V1 can capture the 
exclusive commission pricing right and both V1 and the online platform will get better 
economic performance than when the online platform sets commission prices to vendors. The 
following proposition provides some insights on the commission prices with the transfer of 




This proposition indicates the change of commission prices before and after V1 gets the 
exclusive commission pricing right. It is interesting to see that, when V1 gets the exclusive 
commission pricing right, it does not push down the commission price, but instead pushes up 
the commission price. This contradicts the common sense that V1’s aim for an exclusive 
commission pricing is to reduce the commission price paid to the online platform. Therefore, 
we can conclude that V1 obtains the exclusive commission pricing right at the expense of 
bearing the higher commission price. Despite all of this, because of a relatively large gap of 
the competitive advantage between V1 and V2, i.e., 𝐼𝑃3 < 𝜌 <
4
3
, the exclusive commission 
pricing strategy between the online platform and V1 produces better economic performance 
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for both. Intuitively, the platform firm benefits from the higher commission fee received from 
both vendors and, for the powerful vendor, the advantage gained from the competition with 
the rival vendor can outweigh the cost incurred from higher commission fee.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper considers an online retail supply chain in which two vendors sell perfectly 
substitutable products through an online platform. As the Stackelberg leader, there are three 
alternative strategies for the online platform to set the commission price with the vendors, 
including setting commission price to V1 only, V2 only, and both V1 and V2. Under each 
commission pricing strategy, we analyze the game model and obtain the equilibrium solutions. 
We then examine the effect of the three different commission pricing strategies on the firms’ 
economic performance individually and collectively and explore the two vendors’ tactical 
behavior when battle for their own preferable commission pricing strategies. Our analysis 
results provide some interesting insights: 
First, from the perspective of the online platform, it is optimal to choose the strategy of 
setting commission price to both V1 and V2, since it can get the most profit compared with 
the other two commission pricing strategies. From the perspective of the vendors, V1 may 
have a desire to capture the exclusive commission pricing right but faces obstruction from V2 
who wants to prevent V1 from getting the exclusive commission pricing right. V2 is capable 
of doing so if the gap of competitive advantages between the two vendors is marginal. 
However, when the competitive advantage gap between the two vendors increases to a certain 
extent (𝐼𝑃3), V1 can secure the exclusive commission pricing right and both the online 
platform and V1 can achieve Pareto improvement. Surprisingly, the exclusive commission 
pricing right that V1 battles for will push up the commission price paid to the online platform, 
which may contradict the common sense of setting a lower commission price. However, the 
trade-off between the economic benefit gained from horizontal competition and the cost from 
commission fees determines the optimal choice of commission pricing strategies for the two 
vendors.  
This research makes the following key contributions. This study examines the effects of 
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alternative commission pricing strategies on operational decisions (e.g., price and quantity), 
and consequential economic performance. However, in the context of a triadic interfirm 
network, firms will often take necessary actions to maximize their own benefit, or 
alternatively minimize the negative impact of the deal reached by the other two parties. By 
modeling the vendors’ behavior when battling for their own preferable commission pricing 
strategy, our research provides an approach to explore potential behavioral changes in a 
triadic network setting. Our research responds to the proposition that structural and behavioral 
approaches represent incommensurable ideas, and we show that a combined theoretical 
strategy appears well-adapted to the complex realities of interfirm networks. Therefore, we 
join the attempts to return network research to a theory-driven mode rather than a purely 
method-driven mode (Madhaven et al, 2004; Shipilov and Li, 2008). Second, our findings 
provide several interesting managerial insights that have the potential to help firms in various 
forms and market positions to make important strategic and operational decisions to improve 
their competitiveness. From a practical perspective, previous research has indicated that an 
exclusive commission pricing right is a preferred option for vendors to set commission fees 
with platform firms. Our analysis results show that this applies to the more powerful vendor 
but is not the case for the smaller vendor, as they benefit most from the bilateral commission 
pricing strategy. An exclusive commission pricing right can deliver better economic 
performance for both the more powerful vendor and the online platform. However, it is not 
sustainable because such a performance improvement is at the expense of both vendors 
paying a higher commission fee and the smaller vendor losing out in the horizontal 
competition with the rival vendor. From the online platforms’ perspective, their success is not 
just about profit but depends on good customer value (e.g., competitive retail prices and good 
shopping experiences) and the multi-win among all the vendors regardless of their size or 
economic power. 
Despite the contributions outlined above, this study also has some limitations, and 
addressing them points out several directions for future research. First, we assume that the 
two competing vendors sell perfectly substitutable products through the online platform. 
Although such an assumption can apply to many product categories in the retail sector, one 
future research direction could be to extend to a more general case including both perfectly 
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and partially substitutable products. Second, a linear and additive deterministic demand 
function is adopted in this research. Although this widely adopted form of demand function 
has an advantage of being more analytically tractable, market uncertainty may affect the 
outcome of alternative commission pricing strategies. One future extension is to use a 
stochastic demand function to explore how the results might be influenced by demand 
uncertainty. Furthermore, for online platform firms, one main factor that determines 
commission price is often the cost (e.g., fulfilment), but this factor is not considered since 
perfect product substitution often leads to same fulfilment cost. One important extension is to 
incorporate fulfillment cost into the modeling for a more general product substitution case. 
Finally, our modeling and analysis of commission pricing strategy on online retail platforms 
are studied under the assumption of information symmetry. One future extension is to 
consider the problem under the setting of asymmetric information.  
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Numerical example illustration 
Figures 2 and 3 are produced based on numerical examples. According to Table 3, the 
maximum profits of both vendors and the online platform are now written as the form that is 
dependent on the maximum marginal profit 𝛿1 and 𝛿2, and the sensitivity of sale quantity to 
price 𝛽. Additionally, the ratio of maximum marginal profit 𝜌 = 𝛿1 𝛿2⁄  shows the gap of 
competitive advantage between V1 and V2. The maximum profits can be rewritten as another 





 as an example. 𝜋1














. The sensitivity of sale quantity to price 𝛽 and maximum marginal 
profit of V2, 𝛿2 are fixed and assigned a value. Note that although 𝛿2 = 𝛼2 − 𝑐2, we can 
assign 𝛿2 directly. Without loss of generality, we define the sensitivity of sale quantity to 
price is 𝛽 = 1 ($/per unit), that is, each additional unit of sale quantity will reduce the retail 
price by one unit. The maximum marginal profit of V2 is defined as 𝛿2 = 10 ($/per unit), 
that is, under the condition without commission price, the maximum marginal profit that V2 
can gain is $10 for each product. The assumption of V1 having a competitive advantage over 
V2 leads to that V1 has a higher maximum marginal profit V2, i.e., 𝛿1 > 𝛿2. Thus 𝜌 > 1. 
According to Propositions 2 and 3, the gap of competitive advantage 𝜌 is an important 
variable affecting the conclusion. Thus the gap of competitive advantage 𝜌 is chosen as a 




then Figure 2 can be drawn by going through each unit in the feasible interval. Based on 
Inflection Points 2 and 3, we can obtain Figure 3 and show the battle behaviors between V1 
and V2. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
When the online platform sets commission price to V1, V2 passively accepts the commission 
price decided by the online platform and V1. In this case, 𝑠2 = 𝑠1. According to the first 
order condition of 𝜋𝑆1(𝑞1), we can get the reaction function with respect to 𝑠1 is 𝑞1 =
𝛿1−𝑠1−𝛽𝑞2
2𝛽

















< 0, we can get 𝑠1 =
𝛿1+𝛽𝑞2
2
. Substituting 𝑠1 into 𝜋1(𝑞1) 


















2 = −3𝛽 < 0. So 𝜋1(𝑞1) is concave in 𝑞1 and 𝜋2(𝑞2) is 









































𝐴 should be nonnegative, then 1 < 𝜌 <
4
3
 must be 
satisfied.  
When the online platform sets commission price to V2, V1 passively accepts the 
commission price decided by the online platform and V2. In this case, 𝑠1 = 𝑠2. According to 



















< 0, we can get 𝑠2 =
𝛿2+𝛽𝑞1
2
. Substituting 𝑠2 into 


















2 = −2𝛽 < 0 . So 𝜋1(𝑞1)  is concave in 𝑞1 , and 𝜋2(𝑞2)  is 









































𝐵 should be nonnegative, then 1 < 𝜌 <
3
2
 must be 
satisfied.  
Under a discriminatory pricing setting, the online platform sets commission price to both 
V1 and V2; that is, 𝑠1 ≠ 𝑠2. According to the first order condition of 𝜋1(𝑞1) and 𝜋2(𝑞2), 
we can get the reaction function with respect to 𝑠  is 𝑞1 =
−2𝑠1+𝑠2+2𝛿1−𝛿2
3𝛽
 and 𝑞2 =
𝑠1−2𝑠2−𝛿1+2𝛿2
3𝛽






















































> 0. Therefore, 𝜋𝑂(𝑠1, 𝑠2) is jointly concave in 𝑠1 























































𝐶 should be nonnegative, then 1 < 𝜌 < 2 must be satisfied.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 

















numerator 𝑓1(𝜌) = 18𝜌
2 − 39𝜌 + 23 = 0, because (−39)2 − 4 ∗ 18 ∗ 23 < 0, then for all 
1 < 𝜌 <
4
3







Proof of Corollary 1 



































Define 𝑓2(𝜌) = 20𝜌
2 − 36𝜌 + 15 = 0; two roots can be derived, 𝜌3 =
9−√6
10
 and 𝜌4 =
9+√6
10







, Therefore, we have when 1 < 𝜌 < 𝜌4, 𝑓2(𝜌) < 𝑓2(𝜌4) = 0, namely, 𝜋1
𝐵 <
𝜋1
𝐶 , and when 𝜌4 < 𝜌 <
4
3
, we have 𝑓2(𝜌) > 𝑓2(𝜌4) = 0, namely, 𝜋1
𝐵 > 𝜋1




 as an Inflection Point 1, or IP1 for short.  

















. Define 𝑓3(𝜌) = 6𝜌
















𝜌5 < 1 <
4
3







Proof of Proposition 2 
V1 can successfully capture the exclusive commission pricing right when two conditions are 












The first condition is to ensure that under an exclusive commission pricing right, V1 can 













. Define 𝑓4(𝜌) =
9𝜌2 + 6𝜌 − 19, let 𝑓4(𝜌) = 0, two roots can be derived, 𝜌7 =
−1−2√5
3










, so we have when 1 < 𝜌 ≤
2√5−1
3














which means capturing the exclusive commission pricing right will hurt both V1 and the 











𝐶 , hence V1 has a desire to capture the exclusive commission pricing 
right. However, whether V1 can successfully capture the exclusive commission pricing right 
depends on the second condition. Here we define 
2√5−1
3
 as an Inflection Point 2, or IP2 for 
short. 
The second condition is to ensure that V2 cannot stop V1 from getting the exclusive 














Define 𝑓5(𝜌) = 30𝜌




and 𝜌10 = 1 +
1
√30






, so we have when 1 < 𝜌 ≤ 1 +
1
√30

























𝐴 , which means V2 cannot stop V1. Here we define 1 +
1
√30
 as an 
Inflection Point 3, or IP3 for short. 
Because 𝐼𝑃2 < 𝐼𝑃3, so the feasible interval 𝜌 ∈ (1,
4
3
) is divided into three parts. 
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When 𝜌 ∈ (1, 𝐼𝑃2], V1 has no desire; and when 𝜌 ∈ (𝐼𝑃2, 𝐼𝑃3], V1 has the desire but V2 
stops it; and when 𝜌 ∈ (𝐼𝑃3,
4
3
), V1 has desire and V2 cannot stop it, namely, the exclusive 
commission pricing right is captured finally.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From Corollary 1, we know that 𝜋2
𝐶 > 𝜋2
𝐵, so exclusive commission pricing strategy with the 
online platform is worse for V2, so it has no desire to do that. However, once V1 captures the 
exclusive commission pricing right, the profit of V2 will be much worse since 𝜋2
𝐵 > 𝜋2
𝐴. 
Therefore, V2 can do something, such as share a fraction of its profit with the online platform, 
to stop V1 and maintain the case where the online platform sets commission prices to both 





𝐴 ensures that V2 can stop V1 from getting the exclusive commission pricing 
right. Therefore, according to the proof of Proposition 2, only when 1 < 𝜌 ≤ 𝐼𝑃3, can V2 do 
so.  
 












. Define 𝑓6(𝜌) = 41𝜌
2 − 102𝜌 +
54, let 𝑓6(𝜌) = 0, two roots can be derived, 𝜌11 =
3(17−√43)
41
 and 𝜌12 =
3(17+√43)
41
. It is 









, hence for all 1 < 𝜌 <
4
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. Define 𝑓7(𝜌) = 54𝜌
2 − 102𝜌 + 41, let 𝑓7(𝜌) =
0 , two roots can be derived, 𝜌13 =
17−√43
18
 and 𝜌14 =
17+√43
18























𝐶 . Here we define 
17+√43
18
















Proof of Proposition 5 





> 0 for all 1 < 𝜌 <
4
3
.  
 
